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Abstract 
Previous studies have focused mainly on the effect of corruption on pollution. The results of these studies show an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between economic growth and pollution. In addition, some researchers have suggested 
that corruption plays an important role in determining pollution. This study proposes the hypothesis of a nonlinear 
long-run relationship between pollution and corruption. The goal of the study is to investigate the threshold 
cointegration effect of pollution on corruption using panel data for 62 countries over the period from 1997 to 2004. 
The results show that the effect of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) on pollution is insignificant in low-
corruption regimes. This implies that corruption does not slow down environmental pollution in countries with low 
corruption. The impact of the CPI on environmental pollution is also insignificant in high-corruption regimes. This 
result implies that corruption has no adverse impact on environmental pollution in countries with high corruption. 
64, Wen-Hua Rd, Huwei, Yunlin 632, Taiwan. We thank an anonymous referee for insightful comments and suggestions. 
Citation: Shu-Chen Chang and Teng-yu Chang, (2010) ''The relationships between corruption and pollution on corruption regimes'', 
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 30 no.3 pp. 1942-1949. 
Submitted: Oct 16 2009.   Published: July 27, 2010. 
 
      
1. Introduction 
The positive effect of economic growth on pollution and the relationship 
between economic growth and pollution has been widely discussed in previous 
studies. Previous literature (Cole, Elliott, and Fredriksson, 2006; Cole and Fredriksson, 
2009; López and Mitra, 2000) has argued that the quality of a political institution 
plays an important role in environmental pollution. In addition, some studies (Cole, 
2006; Farzin and Bond, 2006; Leitão, 2006; López and Mitra, 2000; Zugravu, Millock 
and Duchene, 2008) have discussed the relationship between corruption and 
environmental quality, and found that the impact of corruption on environmental 
policies has a negative effect, while the impact of democracy has a positive effect. 
Hence, a reduced corruption level induces higher growth rates and stricter 
environmental policies (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006). 
As in previous studies (Cole, 2006), Pellegrinia and Gerlagh (2006) have shown 
that corruption has a positive and direct effect on sulphur dioxide (SO2) and carbon 
dioxide (CO2)  emissions, and an indirect effect on both pollutants via per capita 
income. Leitão (2006) also supports the result that the relationship between 
environment and income is influenced by corruption level, and shows that countries 
with high corruption have high income per capita before reaching the turning point of 
the EKC (environmental Kuznets curve) inverted-U shape. Farzin and Bond’s (2006) 
study supports the result that the interacting term of qualities of political institutions 
and various indicators of societal preference create an inverted-U shaped relationship 
between pollution and income. Previous studies (Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; 
Zugravu et al., 2008) indicate that corruption significantly reduces the stringency of 
environmental policy policy, but that this effect is reduced as political instability 
increases. Therefore, political instability reduces the stringency of environmental 
policy with low corruption levels. In other words, political instability has a negative 
effect on the stringency of environmental regulation when corruption levels are low, 
but a positive effect when corruption is high. Zugravu et al. (2008) find that political 
instability reduces corruption in transition and emerging economies, but that this 
effect is weak in industrialized economies. Thus, corruption may influence 
environmental quality. 
The above-mentioned studies investigate the relationship between corruption and 
pollution quality using a linear approach, while ignoring the nonlinear relationship 
between two variables using a threshold autoregressive model. The goal of this study 
is to test whether the long-run relationship between corruption and pollution is 
nonlinear. 
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2. Empirical Approach 
If a linear model is used as the empirical model for the effect of corruption on 
pollution, it can be expressed as follows:   
t t t CPI PO ε β α + + =                ( 1 )  
where PO denotes the pollutant emissions; CPIt denotes the level of corruption and is 
scaled from 0 (defined as most corrupt) to 10 (defined as least corrupt). 
If pollution and CPI variables are integrated of order one, that is, I(1), it is 
possible to find a stationary linear combination among integrated variables in levels. 
When these variables are cointegrated, it implies that a long-term equilibrium exists in 
Equation (1). Given the existence of a single cointegrating vector in Equation (1), the 
linear error-correction model can be written as follows 
                    ( 2 )   t
p
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Note that p is the lag length,   is the difference operator,   is error-correction 
term,  and   are vector autoregression parameters to be estimated, and 
 is the stochastic disturbance term. According to Hansen and Seo (2002), all 
coefficients, excluding the cointegrating vector 
Δ 1 − t w
Λ ( 1,... ) i i Γ= p
t ε
α, are allowed to vary with the 
regimes if the presence of a threshold effect is shown in Equation (1). Thus, if the 
empirical model is nonlinear, linear modeling may cause problems of misspecification 
and misleading conclusions regarding cointegration. To check this, we applied 
Hansen and Seo’s (2002) Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to determine the presence of 
a threshold effect. If the error-correction model has a threshold effect, a two-regime 
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Where A1 and A2 are coefficient matrices in each of the regimes,  t μ   is an error term, 
  2and γ is a threshold value that needs to be estimated. 
The threshold model (3) has two regimes, defined by the value of the 
error-correction term. Hansen and Seo (2002) propose heteroskedastic-consistent LM 
test statistics, that is, supLM, to test threshold cointegration. In addition, they used the 
bootstrap method to calculate asymptotic critical values and p-values for the supLM 
test. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
The sample data comprise eight years of panel data from 1997 to 2004 covering 62 
countries. We use Transparency International’s (TI) corruption-perceptions-index 
(CPI) to measure corruption, which is often applied in empirical studies to capture 
bureaucratic corruption in a broad empirical scope
1. Corruption is defined by TI as 
the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. The corruption index is a composite 
index based on a variety of assessments created on the basis of elite business surveys 
or expert panels. The score
2 for each country is standardized via a matching 
percentiles technique before being averaged into the CPI. The corruption index in this 
study is rescaled from 0 (defined as least corrupt) to 10 (defined as most corrupt). In 
addition, data on CO2 emissions per capita and the growth rates of these emissions are 
taken from the World Bank Global Development Network Growth Database. 
                                                
Regarding the stationarity of a set of series, the conventional unit root test suffers 
from the problem of low power because it ignores the cross-section trend. Levin, Lin, 
and Chu (2002) proposed a panel unit-root test (LLC test) to solve the problem of the 
conventional unit root test. The test assumes a common unit root process for all series. 
In this study, we applied Levin et al.’s (2002) panel unit-root test to determine 
whether the data are stationary. Table 1 shows that the null hypothesis for stationarity, 
in level and first difference, can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level. This 
implies stationarity of these variables. 
 
1 Although the World Bank’s control of corruption index and the international 
country risk guide are the popular measures of corruption, the former are only 
available for the periods of 1996, 1998, 2000, and from 2002 to 2008. Additionally, 
the latter are computed monthly by the assessments of the staff and have very few 
changes in the covered countries in most months. Although the methodology of 
calculating TI’s corruption index changes over time, the TI’s data are historical 
annually and available for the period from 1995 to 2009, therefore, can capture most 
bureaucratic corruptions in a broader empirical scope.   
2  Its value ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
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Table 1 Unit root test for variables 
Variables Level  First  difference 
R CO2   –11.998 (0.000)***  –5.7E+12 (0.0000)*** 
P CO2   –16.111 (0.000)***  –50.057 (0.0000)*** 
CPI –10.189(0.0000)***  –25.349  (0.0000)*** 
Notes: The values in parentheses are p-values, and *** denotes significant at the 1 
percent level. Exogenous variables in the LLC test include individual effects and 
individual linear trends. 
 
The goal of this study is to investigate the effects of CPI on CO2 growth rates 
and CO2 per capita. Regarding the long-run effect of CPI on CO2 growth rate, the 
estimated cointegrating relationship is  t t t CPI . R CO w × − = 494 0 2
95 0 1 . wt
. For the supLM test 
statistics proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002), the asymptotic p-value with a fixed 
regressor is 0.000, implying that the null of linear cointegration can be strongly 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level. The estimated threshold value   is 
estimated at -0.95, where the error-correction term is used as the threshold variable. 
Countries falling into   and 
γ
95 0 1 . wt − ≤ − − > −   regimes account for 0.51 percent 
and 0.49 percent of the observations, respectively. The first regime occurs as 
, implying that CO2 growth rate is more than 0.95 
percentage points below the CPI. In addition, the second regime occurs as 
. Thus, the first and second regimes are denoted as 
high-corruption and low-corruption regimes, respectively. 
95 0.
95 0.
494 0 1 1 2 CPI . R CO t t − × ≤ − −
494 0 1 1 2 CPI . R CO t t − × > − −
Regarding the effect of CPI on the CO2 per capita, the estimated cointegrating 
relationship is  t t t CPI . P CO w × − = 723 0 2
92 1 1 . wt ≤ −
92 1. CPIt
. For the supLM test statistic, the p-value with 
the fixed regressor is 0.000, implying that the null of linear cointegration can be 
strongly rejected at the 5 percent significance level. The estimated threshold value   
is estimated at 1.92, where the error-correction term is used as the threshold variable. 
Countries falling into   and    regimes account for 0.51 percent and 
0.49 percent of the observations, respectively. Thus, the first regime occurs as 
γ
92 1 1 . wt > −
723 0 2 . P CO t + × ≤
723 0 2 . P CO t
, implying that the CO2 per capita is more than 1.92 
percentage points above the CPI. Moreover, the second regime occurs when 
92 1. CPIt + × > . Thus, the first and second regimes are denoted as 
high-corruption and low-corruption regimes, respectively. 
The two-regime threshold VAR for the effects of CPI on CO2 growth rate are 
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95 . 0 w , u CPI 614 . 3 R CO 260 . 0 w 063 . 0 027 . 0
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− > + Δ − Δ − − −
− ≤ + Δ − Δ − +
= Δ
− − − −
− − − −
(0.096)                    (0.004)        (0.000)     (0.022)
95 . 0 w , u CPI 071 . 0 R CO 004 . 0 w 001 . 0 017 . 0
(0.072)                    (0.381)         (0.025)     (0.077)
95 . 0 w , u CPI 079 . 0 R CO 190 . 0 w 007 . 0 012 . 0
CPI
*
1 t t 4 1 t 1 t 2 1 t
1 t t 3 1 t 1 t 2 1 t
t      (6) 
where the figures in parentheses in Equations (5) and (6) are Eicker-White standard 
errors. ‘*’ denotes significance at 5% level. 
The two-regime threshold VAR for the effects of CPI on the CO2 per capita are 
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(0.097)                    (0.025)            (0.004)    (0.044)
92 1 060 0 018 0 001 0 013 0
(0.070)                    (0.083)            (0.009)    (0.033)
92 1 072 0 183 0 007 0 031 0
1 8 1 1 2 1
*
1 7 1 1 2 1
. w , u CPI . P CO . w . .
. w , u CPI . P CO . w . .
CPI
t t t t t
t t t t t
t       (8) 
where the figures in parentheses in Equations (7) and (8) are Eicker-White standard 
errors. ‘*’ denotes significance at 5% level. 
The estimation of the error-correction term in threshold VAR, wt−1, allows for a 
straightforward investigation into the behavior of the gap between environmental 
pollution and corruption. The relationships between  2 CO P Δ  and  as well as 
 and    both have minimal error-correction effects and minimal 
dynamics. The sign and magnitude of these coefficients are used to analyze the 
adjustment process by which long-run equilibrium between environmental pollution 
and corruption is restored. Error-correction terms in Equations (5) and (6) are 
insignificant at the 5 percent significance level, but significant at the same level in the 
second regime in corruption equation. In addition, based on Equations (7) and (8), 
error-correction terms in CO2 per capita and corruption equation are insignificant at 
the 5 percent significance level. This finding shows an error-correction effect in 
corruption.  
CPI Δ
2 CO R Δ CPI Δ
 
4. Conclusions 
This study models the long-run relationship between pollution and corruption for 
62 countries over the period from 1997 to 2004. This study also provides a better 
  5empirical description of the long-run relationship between pollution and corruption. 
Our empirical methodology used Hansen and Seo’s (2002) threshold cointegration 
approach to consider the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between pollution and 
corruption. 
The results showed that the null hypothesis of linear cointegration would be 
rejected in favor of a two-regime threshold cointegration model. In the short-run, 
corruption has an insignificant negative impact on environmental pollution. The result 
implies that corruption does not create an obvious impact on environmental quality in 
countries with high corruption. According to the results, in the short run, 
environmental pollution is not influenced by corruption in any regime. Thus, 
corruption does not slow down environmental pollution. 
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